Cream-skimming through PPAs – Interactions between Private and Public Long-term Contracts for Renewable Energy
Mats Kröger
No 2092, Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin from DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research
Abstract:
Public support systems and private investments in renewable energy are increasingly existing side-by-side and are both emphasized in policy proposals on the European and national levels. This paper assesses the interaction between the two approaches with respect to cream-skimming, i.e., the potential for low-cost projects to sign private contracts that increase the costs of publicly supported renewable energy. This paper uses a stylized microeconomic model and a numerical simulation to assess this question. It finds that the incentive to cream-skimming exists when governments employ any form of resource differentiation in their renewable energy contracts. The numerical analysis shows that, at current price levels, cream-skimming could increase power prices by 2-6% depending on the PPA’s mark-up. The effect is larger for a wider cost-distribution of renewable energy projects, which might occur as the energy transition proceeds.
Keywords: Climate policy; renewable energy; distributional consequences; creamskimming; contracts for differences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 Q42 Q48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 40 p.
Date: 2024
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-ene, nep-env, nep-ppm and nep-reg
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp2092
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