Voting on Redistribution with Tax Evasion
Rainald Borck
No 329, Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin from DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research
Abstract:
This paper analyzes voting on a linear income tax which is redistributed lump sum to the taxpayers. Individuals can evade taxes, which leads to penalties if evasion is detected. Since preferences satisfy neither single peakedness nor single crossing, an equilibrium may not exist. When it does exist, it may have interesting properties, in particular, the poor and the rich may form a coalition against the middle class.
Keywords: Tax evasion; redistribution; voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 p.
Date: 2003
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-pol and nep-pub
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)
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https://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.40183.de/dp329.pdf (application/pdf)
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Journal Article: Voting on redistribution with tax evasion (2009) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp329
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