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Unionisation Structures and Innovation Incentives

Justus Haucap and Christian Wey

No 398, Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin from DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research

Abstract: This paper examines how different unionisation structures affect firms' innovation incentives and industry employment. We distinguish three modes of unionisation with increasing degree of centralisation: (1) "Decentralisation" where wages are determined independently at the firm-level, (2) "coordination" where one industry union sets individual wages for all firms, and (3) "centralisation" where an industry union sets a uniform wage rate for all firms. While firms' investment incentives are largest under "centralisation" investment incentives are non-monotone in the degree of centralisation: "Decentralisation" carries higher investment incentives than "coordination". Labour market policy can spur innovation by decentralising unionisation structures or through non-discrimination rules.

Pages: 28 p.
Date: 2004
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (148)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Unionisation structures and innovation incentives (2004)
Working Paper: Unionization Structures and Innovation Incentives (2003) Downloads
Working Paper: Unionisation Structures and Innovation Incentives (2003) Downloads
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