Corporate Self-Regulation vs. Ex-Ante Regulation of Network Access: A Model of the German Gas Sector

Georg Meran and Christian Hirschhausen

No 436, Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin from DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research

Abstract: This paper compares the outcomes of corporate self-regulation and traditional ex-ante regulation of network access to monopolistic bottlenecks. In the model of self-regulation, the domestic gas supplier and network owner and the monopsonistic gas customer fix quantities and the network access price, whereas the competitive fringe of foreign gas producers (third party) and the household customers are excluded from the agreement. The results are then compared with the outcome of traditional ex-ante regulation. We find that while industrial self-regulation leads to an exploitation of households, the effect on the foreign producers is unclear.

Keywords: Ex-ante regulation; Competition policy; Non-discriminatory network access; Bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 L51 L95 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13 p.
Date: 2004
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-reg
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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