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Existence of Nash Networks in One-Way Flow Models

Pascal Billand, Christophe Bravard and Sudipta Sarangi ()

No 751, Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin from DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research

Abstract: This paper addresses the existence of Nash equilibria in one-way flow or directed network models in a number of different settings. In these models players form costly links with other players and obtain resources from them through the directed path connecting them. We find that heterogeneity in the costs of establishing links play a crucial role in the existence of Nash networks. We also provide conditions for the existence of Nash networks in models where costs and values of links are heterogeneous.

Keywords: Network Formation; Non-cooperative Games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D85 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 p.
Date: 2007
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-net
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http://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.77524.de/dp751.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Existence of Nash networks in one-way flow models (2008) Downloads
Working Paper: Existence of Nash networks in one-way flow models (2007)
Working Paper: Existence of Nash Networks in One-Way Flow Models (2006) Downloads
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