Subsidies, Knapsack Auctions and Dantzig's Greedy Heuristic

Ludwig Ensthaler and Thomas Giebe

No 880, Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin from DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research

Abstract: A budget-constrained buyer wants to purchase items from a shortlisted set. Items are differentiated by quality and sellers have private reserve prices for their items. Sellers quote prices strategically, inducing a knapsack game. The buyer's problem is to select a subset of maximal quality. We propose a buying mechanism which can be viewed as a game theoretic extension of Dantzig's greedy heuristic for the classic knapsack problem. We use Monte Carlo simulations to analyse the performance of our mechanism. Finally, we discuss how the mechanism can be applied to award R&D subsidies.

Keywords: Auctions; Subsidies; Market Design; Knapsack Problem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 D43 D44 D45 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 8 p.
Date: 2009
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-mic
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Related works:
Working Paper: Subsidies, Knapsack Auctions and Dantzig’s Greedy Heuristic (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp880

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