The value of symmetric information in an agency model with moral hazard: the ex ante contracting case

Randy Silvers

Working Papers from Deakin University, Department of Economics

Keywords: Moral Hazard; Ex Ante Contracting; Informed Principal; Technology; Value of Information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-01-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dkn:econwp:eco_2006_23

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