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Asymmetric Market Shares, Advertising, and Pricing: Equilibrium with an Information Gatekeeper

Michael Arnold (), Chenguang Li, Christine Saliba and Lan Zhang
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Chenguang Li: Indiana University
Christine Saliba: University of Delaware

No 08-14, Working Papers from University of Delaware, Department of Economics

Abstract: We analyze the impact of market share on advertising and pricing decisions by firms that sell to loyal, non-shopping customers and can advertise to shoppers through an information intermediary or "gatekeeper." In equilibrium the firm with the smaller loyal market advertises more aggressively but prices less competitively than the firm with the larger loyal market, and there is no equilibrium in which both firms advertise with probability 1. The results differ significantly from earlier literature which assumes all prices are revealed to shoppers and finds that the firm with the smaller loyal market adopts a more competitive pricing strategy. The predictions of the model are consistent with advertising and pricing behavior observed on price comparison websites such as

Keywords: online markets; E-commerce; market share; information gatekeeper; equilibrium price dispersion; advertising (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D4 D83 L19 L89 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2008
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