Bank instability: Interbank linkages and the role of disclosure
Stefan Trautmann and
Razvan Vlahu ()
Working Papers from DNB
We study the impact of disclosure about bank fundamentals on depositors behavior in the presence (and absence) of economic linkages between financial institutions. Using a controlled laboratory environment, we identify under which conditions disclosure is conducive to bank stability. We find that bank deposits are sensitive to perceived bank performance. While banks with strong fundamentals benefit from more precise disclosure, an opposing effect is present for solvent banks with weaker fundamentals. Depositors take information about economic linkages into account and correctly identify when disclosure about one institution conveys meaningful information for others. Our findings highlight both the costs and benefits of bank transparency and suggest that disclosure is not always stability enhancing.
Keywords: Disclosure; Banks; Interbank linkages; Coordination; Beliefs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 G21 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban
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Journal Article: Bank instability: Interbank linkages and the role of disclosure (2022)
Working Paper: Bank instability: Interbank linkages and the role of disclosure (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dnb:dnbwpp:665
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