Forward Contracts, Market Structure, and the Welfare Effects of Mergers

Nathan Miller and Joseph Podwol
Additional contact information
Nathan Miller: Georgetown University
Joseph Podwol: U.S. Department of Justice

No 201702, EAG Discussions Papers from Department of Justice, Antitrust Division

Abstract: We examine how forward contracts affect economic outcomes under generalized market structures. In the model, forward contracts discipline the exercise of market power by making profit less sensitive to changes in output. This impact is greatest in markets with intermediate levels of concentration. Mergers reduce the use of forward contracts in equilibrium and, in markets that are sufficiently concentrated, this ampli-fies the adverse effects on consumer surplus. Additional analyses of merger profitability and collusion are provided. Throughout, we illustrate and extend the theoretical re-sults using Monte Carlo simulations. The results have practical relevance for antitrust enforcement.

Keywords: forward contracts; hedging; mergers; antitrust policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 L41 L44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 50 pages
Date: 2017-10
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.justice.gov/atr/forward-contracts-mark ... lfare-e-ects-mergers (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:doj:eagpap:201702

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in EAG Discussions Papers from Department of Justice, Antitrust Division Department of Justice Antitrust Division 450 Fifth Street NW Washington, DC 20530. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tung Vu ().