Legislative Activity and Private Benefits: A Natural Experiment in New Zealand
Massimo Morelli (),
Moritz Osnabrügge and
No 116, Working Papers from "Carlo F. Dondena" Centre for Research on Social Dynamics (DONDENA), Università Commerciale Luigi Bocconi
We examine the causal effect of legislative activity on private benefits, which have been largely neglected by previous research in legislative studies. By relying on a natural experiment in New Zealand, where randomly selected MPs are given the opportunity to propose legislation, we find evidence for a causal relation between proposing a (successful) bill and the private benefits MPs receive, in terms of gifts and payments for services. We conclude that the allocation of private benefits depends on legislative performance.
Pages: 42 pages
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Journal Article: Legislative Activity and Private Benefits: A Natural Experiment in New Zealand (2020)
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