Price-Matching Cannot Sustain Collusion if One or More Consumers Incur Enforcement Costs

Masahiro Ashiya ()

ISER Discussion Paper from Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University

Abstract: This paper studies the effects of 'price-matching' policies in the Bertrand oligopoly model. If one or more consumers incur enforcement costs to utilize price-matching clauses, the unique equilibrium outcome is the competitive one.

Keywords: PRICES; MARKET STRUCTURE; OLIGOPOLIES (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 8 pages
Date: 1999
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0472

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