Herd Behavior of Japanese Economists

Masahiro Ashiya () and Takero Doi

ISER Discussion Paper from Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University

Abstract: Suppose competent economists obtain common information on business forecasts, and incompetent economists obtain independent information. If no one knows who is able, young economists mimic others because a forecast different from others indicated inability when it proves wrong. An older economist, however, can infer his ability from past information. Those who got useful information stop herding to signal their ability when economists are heterogeneous. All economists herd together when economists are homogenous and the merit from signaling is small. The empirical results suggests that Japanese economists are more homogenous than American.

Keywords: FORECASTS; UNCERTAINTY; INFORMATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 42 pages
Date: 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Journal Article: Herd behavior of Japanese economists (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0479

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