Who would get Gains from EU's Quantity Restraint on Emissions Trading in the Kyoto Protocol?

Y. Kaino, Tatsuyoshi Saijo (tatsuyoshisaijo@gmail.com) and T. Yamato

ISER Discussion Paper from Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka

Abstract: The EU proposal on the quantity restraint of the emissions trading in the Kyoto Protocol aims at reducing the so called hot air that would be generated by the purchase of emissions permits sold by a country whose actual emissions are much lower than the assigned amount. In this paper we show that no quantity restraint of all demanders is not a subgame perfect equilibrium, but quantity restraints with a least one country constitute the equilibria.

Date: 2000-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0493

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