Voluntary Participation Game Experiments with a Non-Excludable Public Good: Is Spitefulness a Source of Cooperation?

Tatsuyoshi Saijo (), T. Yamato, K. Yokotani and Timothy Cason

ISER Discussion Paper from Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University

Abstract: Economic theory predicts that it is impossible to have cooperation in finitely repeated games such as a prisoner's dilemma game without communication. In an experiment on a voluntary participation game with a non-excludable public good that is a version of a Hawk-Dove game, we obderved that evolutionary stable strategies did not appear, but cooperation emerged through a transmutation from the Hawk-Dove game to a game where a dominant strategy outcome is Pareto efficient.

Keywords: GAME THEORY; EXPERIMENTS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C90 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0494

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