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Two Patterns of Price Dynamics were Observed in Greenhouse Gases Emissions Trading Experiment: An Application of Point Equilibrium

Yoichi Hizen, Takao Kusakawa, Hidenori NiizawaAuthor-Name: and Tatsuyoshi Saijo ()

ISER Discussion Paper from Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka

Abstract: This paper compares efficiencies of double auction and bilateral trading in GHG emission trading experiments with the addition of two rules, abatement irreversibility of GHG emissions and non-compliance penalty, to Hizen and Saijo (1998). Using a new concept of equilibrium, we found that (i) Results were grouped into two cases. In one case, excessive reductions occurred at the early stage of the experiment and efficiency was relatively low. In the other case, excessive reduction did not occur at the early stage of experiment and efficiency was relatively high. (ii) In both cases, efficiency of double auction was higher than that of bilateral trading. (iii) Emissions trading lowered emissions reduction costs. (iv) Excessive emissions reduction occurred in almost all the sessions.

Date: 2001-10
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