Beliefs in Repeated Games

John Nachbar

ISER Discussion Paper from Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka

Abstract: Consider a two-player discounted infinitely repeated game. A player's belief is a probability distribution over the opponent's repeated game strategies. This paper shows that, for a large class of repeated games, there are no beliefs that satisfy three conditions, learnability, consistency, and a diversity condition, CS. This impossibility theorem generalizes results in Nachbar (1997).

Date: 2003-09
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Journal Article: Beliefs in Repeated Games (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0597

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