Cognition and Behavior in Two-Person Guessing Games: An Experimental Study
Miguel Costa-Gomes and
Vincent Crawford
ISER Discussion Paper from Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka
Abstract:
This paper reports experiments that elicit subjects' initial responses to 16 dominancesolvable two-person guessing games. The structure is publicly announced except for varying payoff parameters, to which subjects are given free access, game by game, through an interface that records their information searches. Varying the parameters allows strong separation of the behavior implied by leading decision rules and makes monitoring search a powerful tool for studying cognition. Many subjects' decisions and searches show clearly that they understand the games and seek to maximize their payoffs, but have boundedly rational models of others' decisions, which lead to systematic deviations from equilibrium.
Date: 2004-08
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)
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https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2004/DP0613.pdf
Related works:
Journal Article: Cognition and Behavior in Two-Person Guessing Games: An Experimental Study (2006) 
Working Paper: Cognition and Behavior in Two-Person Guessing Games: An Experimental Study (2006) 
Working Paper: Cognition and Behavior in Two-Person Guessing Games: An Experimental Study (2004) 
Working Paper: Cognition and Behavior in Two-Person Guessing Games: An Experimental Study (2004) 
Working Paper: COGNITION AND BEHAVIOR IN TWO-PERSON GUESSING GAMES: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY (2004) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0613
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