Maximal Domain for Strategy-Proof Rules in Allotment Economies

Hideyuki Mizobuchi and Shigehiro Serizawa

ISER Discussion Paper from Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka

Abstract: We consider the problem of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. We study how large a preference domain can be to allow for the existence of strategy-proof, symmetric, and efficient allocation rules when the amount of the good is a variable. This question is qualified by an additional requirement that a domain should include a minimally rich domain. We first characterize the uniform rule (Bennasy, 1982) as the unique strategy-proof, symmetric, and efficient rule on a minimally rich domain when the amount of the good is fixed. Then, exploiting this characterization, we establish the following: There is a unique maximal domain that includes a minimally rich domain and allows for the existence of strategy-proof, symmetric, and efficient rules when the amount of good is a variable. It is the single-plateaued domain.

Date: 2005-02
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Journal Article: Maximal Domain for Strategy-proof Rules in Allotment Economies (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0628

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