Optimal Sales Schemes against Interdependent Buyers

Masaki Aoyagi

ISER Discussion Paper from Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka

Abstract: This paper studies a monopoly pricing problem when the seller can also choose the timing of a trade with each buyer endowed with private information about the seller's good. A buyer's valuation of the good is the weighted sum of his and other buyers' private signals, and is affected by the publicly observable outcomes of preceding transactions. We show that it is optimal for the seller to employ a sequential sales scheme in which trading with the buyers takes place one by one. Furthermore, when the degree of interdependence differs across buyers, we analyze how the optimal sales scheme orders them, and how it may induce herding among them.

Date: 2005-10
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2005/DP0645.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: Optimal Sales Schemes against Interdependent Buyers (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0645

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in ISER Discussion Paper from Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Librarian (library@iser.osaka-u.ac.jp).