Strategy-Proof and Anonymous Allocation Rules of Indivisible Goods: A New Characterization of Vickrey Allocation Rule

Shigehiro Serizawa

ISER Discussion Paper from Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka

Abstract: We consider situations where a society allocates a finite units of an indivisible good among agents, and each agent receives at most one unit of the good. For example, imagine that a government allocates a fixed number of licences to private firms, or imagine that a government distributes equally divided lands to households. We show that the Vickrey allocation rule is the unique allocation rule satisfying strategy-proofness, anonymity and individual rationality.

Date: 2006-03
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0648

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