Computational Complexity in the Design of Voting Rules

Koji Takamiya and Akira Tanaka

ISER Discussion Paper from Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka

Abstract: This paper discusses an aspect of computational complexity in social choice theory. We consider the problem of designing voting rules, which is formulated in terms of simple games. We prove that it is an NP-complete problem to decide whether a given simple game is stable, or not.

Date: 2006-07
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0653

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