Domains of Social Choice Functions on which Coalition Strategy-Proofness and Maskin Monotonicity are Equivalent

Koji Takamiya

ISER Discussion Paper from Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka

Abstract: It is known that on some social choice and economic domains, a social choice function is coalition strategy-proof if and only if it is Maskin monotonic (e.g. Muller and Satterthwaite, 1977). This paper studies the foundation of those results. I provide a set of conditions which is sufficient for the equivalence between coalition strategy-proofness and Maskin monotonicity. This generalizes some known results.

Date: 2006-07
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0668

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