Dominant Strategy Implementation in Economic Environments

Hideki Mizukami and Takuma Wakayama

ISER Discussion Paper from Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka

Abstract: We study dominant strategy implementation especially in economic environments. We first show that in general environments, strategy-proofness and quasi-strong-non-bossiness together are necessary and sufficient for dominant strategy implementation via the associated direct revelationmechanism. We next prove that in weak separable environments, strategy-proofness is sufficient for dominant strategy implementation, by using an augmented revelation mechanism similar to the one devised by Jackson et al. (1994). Moreover, we focus on pure exchange economies without free disposal, and try to construct another augmented revelation mechanism that satisfies balancedness in and out of equilibrium, and which implements all strategy-proof social choice functions in dominant strategy equilibria.

Date: 2006-07
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Journal Article: Dominant strategy implementation in economic environments (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0669

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