Coalitionally Strategy-Proof Rules in Allotment Economies of Homogeneous Indivisible Goods

Kentaro Hatsumi and Shigehiro Serizawa

ISER Discussion Paper from Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka

Abstract: We consider the allotment problem of homogeneous indivisible goods among agents with single-peaked and risk-averse von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility functions. We establish that a rule satisfies coalitional strategy-proofness, same-sideness, and strong symmetry if and only if it is the uniform probabilistic rule. By constructing an example, we show that if same-sideness is replaced by respect for unanimity, this statement does not hold even with the additional requirements of no-envy, anonymity, at most binary, peaks-onlyness and continuity.

Date: 2007-03, Revised 2009-02
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0686rr

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