Secure Implementation in Economies with Indivisible Objects and Money

Yuji Fujinaka and Takuma Wakayama

ISER Discussion Paper from Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka

Abstract: This paper studies the application of the notion of secure implementation (Cason, Saijo, Sjostrom, and Yamato, 2006; Saijo, Sjostrom, and Yamato, 2007) to the problem of allocating indivisible objects with monetary transfers. We propose a new domain-richness condition, termed as minimal richness. We then establish that on any minimally rich domain, only constant social choice functions are securely implementable.

Date: 2007-10
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Journal Article: Secure implementation in economies with indivisible objects and money (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0699

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