Uniform, Equal Division, and Other Envy-free Rules between the Two

Toyotaka Sakai and Takuma Wakayama

ISER Discussion Paper from Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka

Abstract: This paper studies the problem of fairly allocating an amount of a divisible resource when preferences are single-peaked. We characterize the class of envy-free and peak-only rules and show that the class forms a complete lattice with respect to a dominance relation. We also pin down the subclass of strategy-proof rules and show that the subclass also forms a complete lattice. In both cases, the upper bound is the uniform rule, the lower bound is the equal division rule, and any other rule is between the two.

Date: 2008-11
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0723

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