Monopoly Sale of a Network Good

Masaki Aoyagi

ISER Discussion Paper from Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka

Abstract: This paper studies the problem of a monopolist who sells a network good through a price posting scheme. The scheme posts a price of every possible allocation for each buyer, who are then asked to report their private information to the seller. The seller then implements the allocation based on the reports. The social choice functions that are ex post implementable through such a sales scheme are characterized, and the conditions are identified under which the revenue maximizing scheme has the property that the price of a larger network is more affordable than that of a smaller network.

Date: 2010-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cta and nep-net
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0794

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