A Theory of Multidimensional Information Disclosure

Wataru Tamura

ISER Discussion Paper from Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka

Abstract: We study disclosure of information about the multidimensional state of the world when uninformed receivers' actions affect the sender's utility. Given a disclosure rule, the receivers form an expectation about the state following each message. Under the assumption that the sender's expected utility is written as the expected value of a quadratic function of those conditional expectations, we identify conditions under which full and no disclosure is optimal for the sender and show that a linear transformation of the state is optimal if it is normally distributed. We apply our theory to advertising, political campaigning, and monetary policy.

Date: 2012-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-mic and nep-upt
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0828

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