Endogenous Information Acquisition and Partial Announcement Policy

Hiroki Arato, Takeo Hori and Tomoya Nakamura

ISER Discussion Paper from Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka

Abstract: We extend the model of Cornand and Heinemann (2008, Economic Journal) and examine how to implement partial announcement by selling public information when the agents' action is strategic complements. In a game of information acquisition, there exist multiple equilibria and the partial announcement equilibrium is unstable if the authorities sell public information at a constant price. However, if the authorities offer an increasing pricing rule, partial announcement equilibrium is stable and implementable.

Date: 2014-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0892

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