Endogenous Information Acquisition and the Partial Announcement Policy

Hiroki Arato, Takeo Hori and Tomoya Nakamura

ISER Discussion Paper from Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University

Abstract: We consider implementability and the welfare effects of a partial announcement policy using a model of a beauty contest where agents' actions are strategic complements and where their decisions on public information acquisition are endogenous. The following results are obtained: i) if the authorities sell public information at a constant price, multiple equilibria emerge and a partial announcement equilibrium is unstable; ii) here exist pricing rules that ensure the uniqueness and stability of mixed strategy equilibria, which indicates that a partial announcement policy can be implemented; iii) the optimal price of public information rises as its precision increases relative to private information; iv) the optimal price is independent of the degree of strategic complementarity.

Keywords: Beauty contest games; Endogenous information acquisition; Transparency of information; Partial announcement policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-01, Revised 2014-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Journal Article: Endogenous information acquisition and the partial announcement policy (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0892r

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