Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Mechanisms for Public Decision with Money

Kazuhiko Hashimoto and Kohei Shiozawa

ISER Discussion Paper from Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka

Abstract: We study strategy-proof probabilistic mechanisms in a binary public decision model when monetary transfers are allowed. We consider not only the pivotal mechanism, the majority voting mechanism, the random serial dictatorship mechanism, and the unanimity mechanism, but also the random chair pivotal mechanism (Faltings 2005), which is a probabilistic variant of the pivotal mechanism.

Date: 2016-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0964

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