The countervailing power hypothesis when dominant retailers function as sales promoters

Noriaki Matsushima and Shohei Yoshida

ISER Discussion Paper from Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka

Abstract: We consider a downstream oligopoly model with one dominant and several fringe retailers, who purchase a manufacturing product from a monopoly supplier. We then examine how the supplier's outside option influences the relation between the dominant retailer's bargaining power and the equilibrium retail price. If the market demand shrinks due to a breakdown of bargaining between the supplier and the dominant retailer, who works as a sales promoter for the product, there is a negative relation between the bargaining power and the retail price. Furthermore, retailers' efficiency improvements increase the retail price if the dominant retailer's bargaining power is strong.

Date: 2016-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-mkt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2016/DP0981.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: The Countervailing Power Hypothesis when Dominant Retailers Function as Sales Promoters (2018)
Working Paper: The Countervailing Power Hypothesis when Dominant Retailers Function as Sales Promoters (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0981

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in ISER Discussion Paper from Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Librarian ().