Economics at your fingertips  

Minimum price equilibrium in the assignment market

Yu Zhou and Shigehiro Serizawa ()

ISER Discussion Paper from Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University

Abstract: We investigate an assignment market where multiple objects are assigned, together with associated payments, to a group of agents with unit demand preferences. Preferences over bundles, the pairs of (object, payment), accommodate income effects. Among all (Walrasian) equilibria in such a market, there is one supported by the coordinate-wise minimum prices, the minimum price equilibrium (MPE). We propose a price adjustment process, "the Serial Vickrey process," that finds an MPE in a finite number of steps. The Serial Vickrey process introduces objects one by one, and on the basis of the structural properties of MPE, the "Serial Vickrey sub-process" sequentially finds an MPE for k+1 objects by using an MPE for k objects. In the Serial Vickrey process, instead of revealing the whole preference, each agent only reports finitely many "indifference prices." We also discuss the application of the Serial Vickrey process to calibrate agents' utility functions in the quantitative analysis of housing market research in the assignment model.

Date: 2019-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in ISER Discussion Paper from Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Librarian ().

Page updated 2020-06-29
Handle: RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1047