Pecuniary Externalities, Bank Overleverage, and Macroeconomic Fragility

Ryo Kato and Takayuki Tsuruga

ISER Discussion Paper from Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka

Abstract: Pecuniary externalities in models with financial friction justify macroprudential policies for preventing economic agents’ excessive risk taking. We extend the Diamond and Rajan (2012) model of banks with the production factors and explore how a pecuniary externality affects a bank’s leverage. We show that the laissez-faire banks in our model take on excessive risks compared with the constrained social optimum. Our numerical simulations suggest that the crisis probability is 2--3 percentage points higher in the laissez-faire economy than in the constrained social optimum.

Date: 2020-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-mac and nep-rmg
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Journal Article: Pecuniary externalities, bank overleverage, and macroeconomic fragility (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1078

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