Dynamic Legislative Bargaining
Kirill Evdokimov () and
Jan Zapal ()
ISER Discussion Paper from Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
This article surveys the theoretical literature on legislative bargaining with endogenous status-quo. These are the legislative bargaining situations in which in each period a new policy is decided and the policy implemented in the event of no agreement is endogenously determined by the outcome of bargaining in the previous period. After describing a general framework, we discus bargaining over redistributive policies, bargaining over spatial policies, existence issues, eﬃciency issues and open questions.
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1090
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