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Serial Vickrey Mechanism

Yu Zhou and Shigehiro Serizawa ()

ISER Discussion Paper from Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University

Abstract: We study an assignment market where multiple heterogenous objects are sold to unit demand agents who have general preferences accommodating imperfect transferability of utility and income effects. In such a model, there is a minimum price equilibrium. We establish the structural characterizations of minimum price equilibria and employ these results to design the "Serial Vickrey mechanism," that finds a minimum price equilibrium in a finite number of steps. The Serial Vickrey mechanism introduces the objects one by one, and requires agents to report finite-dimensional prices in finitely many times. Besides, the Serial Vickrey mechanism also has nice dynamic incentive properties.

Date: 2020-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-mic and nep-upt
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