Signaling under Double-Crossing Preferences

Chia-Hui Chen, Junichiro Ishida and Wing Suen

ISER Discussion Paper from Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka

Abstract: This paper provides a general analysis of signaling under double-crossing preferences with a continuum of types. There are natural economic environments where the indifference curves of two types cross twice, such that the celebrated single-crossing property fails to hold. Equilibrium exhibits a threshold type below which types choose actions that are fully revealing and above which they pool in a pairwise fashion, with a gap separating the actions chosen by these two sets of types. The resulting signaling action is quasi-concave in type. We also provide an algorithm to establish equilibrium existence by construction.

Date: 2020-10, Revised 2021-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Signaling Under Double‐Crossing Preferences (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1103rr

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