Focal Points, Beliefs, and Distributional Preferences: An Experimental Analysis

João V. Ferreira, Nobuyuki Hanaki and Benoît Tarroux

ISER Discussion Paper from Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka

Abstract: This paper experimentally examines the interplay between focal points, beliefs, and distributional preferences. Contrary to common wisdom, there is no detectable evidence that equal splits act as salient focal points in distributional voting contexts. Participants mispredict others’ preferences: they overestimate egalitarianism when Pareto efficient options are available and underestimate it when efficiency gains come at others’ expense. There is a clear correlation between individuals’ preferences and beliefs (false-consensus bias), and participants are more egalitarian when they perceive a low probability of being pivotal (cheap fairman talk). These findings challenge assumptions about focal points and highlight beliefdriven behavior in distributional settings.

Date: 2025-05
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1287

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