Constrained Efficiency and Strategy-Proofness in Package Assignment Problems with Money

Hiroki Shinozaki and Shigehiro Serizawa

ISER Discussion Paper from Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka

Abstract: We consider a package assignment problem with money, in which a set M of objects is allocated to agents. Each agent has preferences that are not necessarily quasi-linear. The admissible set of object allocations is chosen by the planner to pursue specific objectives in conjunction with the rule. A rule satisfies constrained efficiency if no allocation ―whose object allocation is admissible under the rule―Pareto dominates the outcome allocation. We study the compatibility between constraints on admissible object allocations and desirable properties of rules, and establish: A rule satisfies constrained efficiency and strategy-proofness, together with other mild properties, if and only if its admissible set is bundling unit-demand for some partition of M, satisfies no wastage and anonymity, and the rule is a bundling unit-demand minimum price Walrasian rule.

Date: 2025-07, Revised 2025-09
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