Who Should Bear the Administrative Costs of an Emissions Tax?
John Stranlund () and
Carlos Chavez ()
No 2011-3, Working Papers from University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Resource Economics
All environmental policies involve administrative costs, the costs of implementing and managing policies that extend beyond abatement costs. We examine theoretically the optimal distribution of these costs between the public and regulated sources of pollution. The distribution of administrative costs affects social welfare only if public funds are more expensive than private funds, or if the distribution of administrative costs affects the size of a regulated industry. If having the public take on a larger part of administrative costs increases the size of the industry and this does not lead to lower emissions for a given emissions tax, then it is optimal to make the pollution sources bear all of the administrative costs. A necessary, but not sufficient, reason for having the public bear part of the cost burden is if aggregate emissions decrease as a result.
Keywords: Emissions Taxes; Pigouvian Taxes; Administrative Costs; Pollution Control (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L51 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-env and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://courses.umass.edu/resec/workingpapers/docum ... rkingPaper2011-3.pdf (application/pdf)
Journal Article: Who should bear the administrative costs of an emissions tax? (2013)
Working Paper: Who Should Bear the Administrative Costs of an Emissions Tax? (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dre:wpaper:2011-3
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Resource Economics
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Eileen Keegan ().