Création de valeur actionnariale et chômage dans un modèle WS-PS
No 2006-15, EconomiX Working Papers from University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX
The purpose of the article is to analyse the consequences of the constraint of shareholder value on the wage level and equilibrium unemployment rate. We will relate the new program of maximization of the firm, as well as the one of the trade union. We obtain an increase of the unemployment rate when progressing from a maximization of profit to a maximization of the EVA. The unemployment rate is also now depending on others financial variables.
Keywords: Equilibrium unemployment; shareholder value; shareholding-employee; equilibrium wages; trade-union negotiations. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E24 J23 G12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:drm:wpaper:2006-15
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