Stockage des permis de pollution en incertitude et règle de partage optimal de risques
Johanna Etner and
No 2006-7, EconomiX Working Papers from University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX
The well known economic advantage of tradable permits over command and control obviously vanish if firms do not trade because of policy uncertainty. In fact, uncertainty about changes in the permits program could make firms reluctant to invest in tradable permits. This article proposes to give optimal risk sharing rules in order to respond to policy risk. We show how banking of tradable permits can be used as a tool of policy risk control.
Keywords: Firm behavior; tradable permits; policy risk. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 D80 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:drm:wpaper:2006-7
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