Settlement in Merger Cases: Remedies and Litigation
Bertrand Chopard (),
Thomas Cortade () and
Andreea Cosnita-Langlais ()
No 2008-10, EconomiX Working Papers from University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX
This paper performs a pre-trial settlement analysis for the negotiation of asset divestitures in merger control cases. Taking into account the asymmetric information between the competition agency and the merging firms concerning the true competition impact of the merger, we examine the impact on the likelihood of settlement divestiture and the divestiture amount in equilibrium of various factors, such as the transfer rate of the merger’s cost savings, the severity of the appeal court, as well as the bargaining power of the merging partners in the sale of the divested assets.
Keywords: out-of-court settlement; merger control; divestitures; asymmetric information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 L41 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com, nep-cta, nep-ind and nep-law
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Journal Article: Success and failure of bargaining in merger control: The case of asset divestitures (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:drm:wpaper:2008-10
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