Bankable Pollution Permits under Uncertainty and Optimal Risk Management Rules: Theory and Empirical Evidence

Julien Chevallier, Johanna Etner and Pierre-André Jouvet

No 2008-25, EconomiX Working Papers from University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX

Abstract: An increase in the demand for agricultural goods leads to the use of more intensive cultivation methods. Though Ricardo sees no difficulties in the intensification process, their existence is revealed by the possible occurrence of multiple equilibria. A general theory of intensive rent is based on a formal parallel with single-product systems without land.

Keywords: Firm behavior; Tradable permits; Policy risk; EU ETS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 D80 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 47 pages
Date: 2008
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr and nep-env
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Working Paper: Bankable Pollution Permits under Uncertainty and Optimal Risk Management Rules: Theory and Empirical Evidence (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:drm:wpaper:2008-25

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