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Responsabilité et indépendance du conseil d’administration: Les apports de l’analyse économique

Antoine Rebérioux

No 2008-37, EconomiX Working Papers from University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX

Abstract: Board of directors independence has been a focus for a large series of studies in finance. The overall evidence suggests that independence has no or negative effect on firm performance. Director accountability constitutes a second topic of research, in law and economics. Two distinctive models might be identified. The first one gives primacy to the interests of shareholders, whereas the other advocates enlarged fiduciary duties for directors. We argue that these two issues (independence and accountability) are related. In particular, we show that independence is a strong implication only for the shareholder model of accountability. In turn, the way the poor results of independency are accounted for crucially depends on the way director accountability is analyzed.

Keywords: corporate governance; board of directors; theory of the firm (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G30 D23 K22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2008
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