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Deterrence of a criminal team: how to rely on its members’shortcomings ?

Eric Langlais ()

No 2009-11, EconomiX Working Papers from University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX

Abstract: In this paper, we assume that a criminal organization is an agency where the Principal and the Agent have different sensibilities towards the risk of arrestation and punishment, and at the same time have different skills with respect to general organization tasks, crime realization or detection avoidance activities (i.e. allowing to reduce the probability of detection). In this set up, we first compare two regimes of exclusive sanctions (either the sanctions are borne by the Principal/beneficiary of the crime, or they are borne by the Agent/perpetrator of the crime), and we analyze the comparative efficiency of the various instruments which are at the disposal of public authorities to prevent corporation in criminal activities (frequency of control and level of monetary penalties). Finally, we study a case with joint liability.

Keywords: Criminal teams; corporate criminality; state dependent risk aversion; deterrence; monetary penalties versus detection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K13 K4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-law
Date: 2009
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http://economix.fr/pdf/dt/2009/WP_EcoX_2009-11.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: DETERRENCE OF A CRIMINAL TEAM: HOW TO RELY ON ITS MEMBERS' SHORT COMINGS ? (2009) Downloads
Working Paper: Deterrence of a criminal team: how to rely on its members’ shortcomings? (2009) Downloads
Working Paper: Deterrence of a criminal team: how to rely on its members' shortcomings? (2008) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:drm:wpaper:2009-11

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