On Legal Cooperation and the Dynamics of Legal Convergence

Bertrand Crettez, Bruno Deffains and Olivier Musy

No 2010-17, EconomiX Working Papers from University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX

Abstract: In this paper, we study the dynamics of legal convergence and the comparison between the different instruments of legal convergence based on cooperative strategies (i.e., harmonization and unification) or not. To study these questions we use a model with two nation-states which is inspired in part by that used in Carbonara and Parisi (2008) where preferences of each nation-state are such that it is costly to change the law, but it is also costly to have a different legal system from the other nation-state. We show that legal unification could be achieved in the long-run through small step by step changes despite the existence of huge harmonization costs in the short run. We also show that legal cooperation is not always necessary to achieve legal convergence.

Keywords: Law-and-Economics; Legal Convergence; Legal harmonization; Legal Uniformization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 K00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 40 pages
Date: 2010
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: On Legal Cooperation and the Dynamics of Legal Convergence (2010)
Working Paper: On Legal Cooperation and the Dynamics of Legal Convergence (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:drm:wpaper:2010-17

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