Personal Bankruptcy Law, Fresh Starts, and Judicial Practice
Bertrand Chopard (),
Eric Langlais () and
No 2011-15, EconomiX Working Papers from University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX
We explore the ways French judges respond to the possibility of discharging personal debts in exchange for liquidation of debtors’ assets. We present empirical results on the determinants of judicial selection between debtors whose debts are wiped out and those who have to reimburse them. We find that French judges tend to disqualify debtors with multiple creditors from debt discharge, and are sensitive to regional labor market conditions. These empirical results help us understand better how French personal bankruptcy laws perform compared to other national systems. Finally, our results serve to fill the gap between bankruptcy rules and judicial practice.
Keywords: Personal bankruptcy; over-indebtedness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G33 K29 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
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Journal Article: Personal Bankruptcy Law, Fresh Starts, and Judicial Practice (2013)
Working Paper: Personal bankruptcy law, fresh starts and judicial practice (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:drm:wpaper:2011-15
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