Analyse économique et droit pénal: contributions, débats, limites
No 2011-33, EconomiX Working Papers from University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX
The paper surveys the main criticisms against the economics of crime à la Becker (JPE, 1968). Some of them (external criticisms) are more focused on methological issues, and are mainly addressed by lawyers. Others (internal criticisms) aim at challenging the central result, according to which large monetary penalties (maximal ones, in fact) induce optimal deterrence, while the probability of controling and sanctioning criminals should be as small as possible. In conclusion, the paper discuss some empirical results.
Keywords: économie du crime; Becker; dissuasion et politique de mise en oeuvre optimale; fonctions du code pénal (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K14 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hpe
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:drm:wpaper:2011-33
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